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In a Persian Mosque: Revolutionary Shi’a 
Islam and Independence in Iran 
By M. Anees Aref 
“If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit this nation to be 
the slaves of Britain one day, and America the next.”[1] 
“If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit some agent of 
America to carry out these scandalous deeds; they will throw him out of 
Iran.”[2] 
 “Neither East nor West, Islamic Republic.” 
As if issued from the heights of a minaret, the cry for the reclamation of a 
nation’s lost pride and dignity are heard in the words quoted above. They echo 
the bitterness of Iran’s long subjection to foreign masters, and the necessity of 
a near holy struggle to rid itself of this humiliating bondage.  The Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 saw the overthrow of the regime of Shah Mohammed Reza 
Pahlavi and with it the end of Iran’s monarchy, an institution in one form or 
another dating back to the 6th century BCE and its founder Cyrus the Great. In 
its place emerged the Islamic Republic of Iran. The group who eventually 
emerged as the leading force behind this revolutionary movement was a 
faction of religious scholars led by the figure of Ayatollah Ruhulloh Khomeini. 
However, other participants including nationalists, socialists, and the 
merchant class of the bazaar (bazaaris) also were major actors in this 
revolutionary process with their own set of grievances and revolutionary goals. 
Groups such as university students and other secular-minded nationalists 
demanded greater political representation, national independence, and more 
effective state management of the economy. The religious scholars, or clerics, 
resented the regime’s suppression of Islamic institutions in society and felt the 
traditional religion and culture of Iran was under attack. 
Additionally, many of these groups were united in resentment of foreign 
domination of Iranian political and economic life, particularly that of the 
United States. This was in large measure due to the United States’ support of 
the Pahlavi regime, the American-engineered coup of 1953 that removed 
Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh–a secular-minded, democratically 
elected leader–and the subsequent re-installment of the Shah. Due to 
circumstances which I will discuss throughout this essay, the Shia clerics and 
Khomeini came to control the revolutionary movement and shape its outcome, 
leading to the establishment of the Islamic republic. This writer argues that 
Khomeini and his faction of clerics (mullahs) were able to use Shia Islamic 
rhetoric and ideas of independence and anti-imperialism in a way that unified 
both the secular and religious elements within the anti-Shah movement, 
allowing the clerics to achieve the greatest political gains in the process. To 
demonstrate how Khomeini and his faction of Shia clerics went about 
assuming this mantle of leadership in the revolutionary movement, this paper 
will particularly focus on Khomeini’s rhetorical emphasis on political and 
economic independence as well as anti-imperialism. How the religious 
leadership implemented their goals within the new political system will also be 
discussed. Understanding these issues will better illuminate the achievements 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the nature of its relationship with 
the United States and how this continues to impact regional and international 
conflicts in the present. 
Outline of Content 
First, a word on the organization of this paper. I will begin with a brief 
introduction to the historical background of the 1979 Iranian revolution. This 
will focus on the origins of Iran’s modern tensions with the West, the 
development of secular and religious opposition to the Pahlavi monarchy, as 
well as some of the policies and institutional structures that gave rise to anti-
regime sentiment. Next, I will give a brief account of the various ideological 
elements within the anti-shah opposition, particularly the leftist/secular 
parties, and the growth of the religious faction led by Khomeini. The body of 
the essay will analyze numerous primary sources with this historical 
background in mind. A consideration of how the new Islamic Republic 
implemented the goals of the revolutionary leadership, followed by a 
discussion of the legacy of the Iranian revolution and its significance for the 
present day will round out the conclusion. 
Historiography on the Revolutionary Period 
Scholarly research on the Iranian Revolution has focused on the relationship 
between various groups who participated in the revolutionary movement. 
Homa Firouzbakhch, whose studies have focused on the social dimensions of 
the movement, argues that it was the demographic forces of urban population 
growth and increased social mobility that did not see accompanying political 
representation, and different groups having the “incentive and the capacity to 
mobilize for collective action”.[4] Firouzbakhch consults numerous population 
surveys and census statistical data to support these arguments. In exploring 
the relationships between these different anti-shah groups scholars have 
focused on the various factors that united their opposition to the Pahlavi 
regime. In a 1983 interview with sociologist Ahmad Ashraf, historian Ervand 
Abrahamian reveals the long-standing relationship between the Shia clerics 
and the bazaaris of middle and lower economic standing. The mosques and 
the bazaar are generally located in close proximity to each other within Iran’s 
urban set up, with the bazaar providing financial support for the mosque and 
the clerics providing support for the bazaaris in political issues with the 
state.[5] Additionally, both groups have managed to preserve Iran’s traditional 
urban culture.[6] 
Other scholarly research by Misagh Parsa has emphasized the bazaaris’ 
economic grievances and subsequent mobilization for revolutionary action 
against the Pahlavi regime.[7] Parsa argues that the Pahlavi’s government’s 
economic policies–particularly monetary policy and commodity price 
controls–caused major losses to bazaar merchants and businesses and 
resulted in hostile resentment towards the regime. Combined with the 
bazaaris’ great capacity for mobilization and collective action, these factors 
played a leading role in the later removal of the regime.[8] Parsa uses official 
newspapers, interviews with revolutionary participants, government 
documents and scholarly sources on Iran’s economic development as primary 
sources for this study’s analysis. This work builds on the Abrahamian/Ashraf 
interview mentioned above in its analysis of bazaari participation in the 
revolution, and offers abundant economic data and historical perspective on 
that group’s position in Iranian society and its relationship to the monarchy. 
Parsa diverges from Firouzbakhch’s argument for social mobility and the 
newly emerged Iranian middle class as being the significant source of 
discontent with the Pahlavi regime instead of arguing for the bazaar class’s 
central role. 
Scholarship has also focused on Iran’s relationship with the outside world and 
its causes for revolutionary action. Evaleila Pesaran shows that hostility 
towards the Pahlavi regime’s western backers was another important factor in 
unifying these groups, and that the idea of economic independence was 
central in revolutionary discourse surrounding this issue.[9] Pesaran identifies 
a number of domestic and international influences on Iranian revolutionary 
ideology and discourse relating to economic issues, particularly Shia Islamic 
traditions concerning social justice, and Marxist-Leninist views of class 
struggle and anti-imperialism. As Pesaran demonstrates, struggle against 
foreign interests within Iran has roots going back to the previous century, and 
provided inspiration for the 1979 revolution’s insistence on economic and 
political sovereignty. Taken together, these scholarly works reveal that this 
was a multi-layered and fragmented revolution concerning political, 
economic, and cultural matters within Iranian society. 
Research Goals/Primary Sources/Methodology 
A careful reading of Imam Khomeini’s (Ayatollah or Imam will be alternately 
used depending on the context) own words will demonstrate how he was able 
to unite the various factions opposing the Shah’s government. Therefore, the 
primary sources consulted for this study will be a collection of writings and 
declarations by Khomeini containing essays, lectures, speeches, and 
interviews that offer valuable glimpses into his views on religion, spirituality, 
history, and various political and cultural issues in Iranian society.[10] My 
paper will use these sources to examine the rhetoric and revolutionary goals 
expressed by Khomeini and measure them against the revolutionary 
movement’s outcomes and how they managed to unify the religious and 
secular groups who supported the revolution and ouster of Shah Pahlavi. The 
first source is a declaration delivered in 1963 from the city of Qum, Iran after a 
violent government assault on an Islamic school resulted in numerous deaths, 
and indicates the degree to which Khomeini felt the regime was attacking 
Islamic institutions and traditional Iranian culture. In a series of lectures in 
1971 Khomeini makes the case for an Islamic system of government and the 
necessity for leadership by the religious scholars and clerics.[11] Here 
Khomeini also reveals his view of Islam not just as a unifying system of 
political, social, and cultural values and institutions, but as a tool of social 
justice and resistance against foreign oppression. 
In addition to these declarations, two separate interviews given by Khomeini 
in 1978 and 1979 further reveal his views on why the American-backed Pahlavi 
regime had to be overthrown, what revolutionary obstacles remained, and the 
impact on regional and international politics the revolution’s success may 
have.[12] Khomeini also offers some thoughts on Shi’a Islam’s historical 
tradition of resistance to “illegitimate” authority, and the role religious 
scholars played in the current rejection of the “illegitimate” authority held by 
the Shah and his western backers. Here is where I will analyze the 
revolutionary concepts of independence and social justice derived from these 
Shi’a traditions. Having considered these sources and the abovementioned 
historical literature, it is hoped that the reader will better understand the 
rhetorical strategies employed by Khomeini’s party to grab the reins of power. 
Historical Background to Revolution[13] 
To understand the origins of the events of 1978/79, it is first necessary to 
digest a bit of modern Iranian history. Iran’s recent tensions with the West 
have roots dating back to the 19th century under the dynastic rule of the Qajar 
shahs. After the wars with czarist Russia in the early part of the century, Iran’s 
defeat resulted in the treaties of Gulistan in 1813, and Turkmanchai in 1828 
and saw the handover of significant chunks of Iran’s northern territory to 
Russia, as well as a number of commercial and economic concessions. These 
events were later followed by the 1857 Treaty of Paris, where the Qajars ceded 
to the British the major city of Herat, now situated in Afghanistan near its 
western border with Iran. The rest of the century and carrying on into the 
20th would see the continued granting of concessions to foreign interests by the 
Qajar rulers and generate growing feelings of national humiliation and 
discontent, this in spite of minor attempts at resisting outside exploitation of 
Iranian resources in the 1905/06 Constitutional Revolution. One major 
concession that would later have direct bearing on the 1979 revolution was the 
access to Iranian oil given to the Anglo-Iranian Oil company (now known as 
BP) at around the turn of the century. 
Following the eventual demise of the Qajar rulers by 1925 and the ascendance 
of the Pahlavi dynasty to Iran’s monarchy, British oil interests would continue 
to operate in Iran until the 1950s, much to the consternation of great numbers 
of Iranians interested in national sovereignty and Iran’s control of its own 
national assets and resources. This sentiment would be acted on in 1951 by the 
newly elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. A nationalist-minded 
secular politician, Mossadegh boldly went on to order the nationalization of 
Iranian oil production, effectively terminating the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company’s stake. This angered the British government, who would then lobby 
the American administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower to intervene 
and reverse the effects of Mossadegh’s policy. This would eventually lead to 
the events of 1953, where an American/CIA engineered coup overthrew the 
democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh and re-installed Shah 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to the throne. After 1953, the nationalist, leftist, and 
religious movements opposing the Shah and American imperialist policies 
would gather steam in response to this episode and the subsequent 25 years of 
political repression, economic inequality, and westernization in the lead up to 
the 1979 revolution. 
Secular Influences 
Amidst the political twists described above and the growing nationalist 
sentiment fueled by the Mossadegh episode, there was the development of 
revolutionary and economic thinking based on both leftist/socialist principles 
found in the international movements of the cold war world of the 1950s and 
1960s, as well as a growing strain of politicized Islamic ideology (sometimes 
referred to as Islamist). Pesaran describes how Marxist-Leninist ideas 
significantly influenced the anti-western and economic views taken by Iranian 
revolutionaries in the period after 1953. The communist affiliated Tudeh Party 
and other socialist groups continued to voice anti-western intervention in 
Iranian economics and politics throughout the pre-revolutionary period, and 
as Pesaran notes: “In spite of their brutal suppression by the state following 
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi’s return to power in 1953, the remnants of the 
Tudeh and its splinter groups continued to influence and even perhaps drive 
the course of Iranian dissident activity.”[14] However, this leftist opposition to 
the Shah did not seek to simply imitate the model provided by the Soviet 
Union or international Marxist-Leninist movements, and sought to find a 
localized form of economic/political independence. 
Growth of the Islamic movement 
A number of Iranian thinkers would be influential in developing an ideology of 
anti-imperialism and economic independence along the lines of traditional 
Shia Islamic principles native to Iran. Khalil Maleki, a member of the Tudeh 
party, sought to break away from a “pro-Western or a pro-Soviet Stance”, 
advocating for a domestic form of Iranian economic independence.[15] Jalal 
Al-e Ahmad complimented this thinking with his proposal for a modernized 
understanding of Islam, using it as a tool for resistance against the corrupting 
and damaging effects of the West on Iran’s economy and society.[16] Probably 
the most influential thinker of the pre-revolutionary period who blended Shia 
Islamic and anti-imperialist principles together was Ali Shari’ati.[17] Shari’ati 
also argued for a domestic revolutionary form of independence, stressing the 
religious character of Iranian society, and demonstrated that “Islam, especially 
Shi’i Islam, was a radical ideology that could outdo Marxism in championing 
revolution and the class struggle as well as in opposing feudalism, capitalism, 
and imperialism.”[18] These various groups and thinkers indicate the merging 
of secular and religious modes of revolutionary thought in the period between 
1953 and 1979, but it was the religious strand that would continue to grow in 
stature and influence within the anti-Shah movement. As Pesaran states: 
“It was only when much of the secular opposition was quashed by the Pahlavi 
state that religion became perhaps the only vehicle through which the 
nationalist and socialist trends of the day could be spread. Indeed, by the 
1960s, not only did the mosque present itself as an ideal forum for mass 
political action, but also religion itself, with its emphasis on social justice and 
equality, fitted well with the slogans of the nationalist and socialist 
opposition.”[19] 
Other factors existed for the growth of the Shia clerical political involvement 
in the 1950s and 1960s, but one sequence of events in particular generated 
strong support for the religious movement against the Shah Pahlavi 
government. 
Khomeini in his Own Words 
As was previously mentioned, while the secular/leftist opposition to the 
Pahlavi government was actively suppressed, the mosque was left relatively 
untouched. This freedom was disrupted on March 22, 1963 by a violent 
government crackdown on a religious school in the city of Qum, where Imam 
Ruhollah Khomeini served as a religious educator and an increasingly vocal 
critic of the Pahlavi government.[20]The incident resulted in the death of 
several students, and helped galvanize sympathy for the religious movement 
led by Khomeini against the Shah, particularly after Khomeini’s subsequent 
arrest and exile the following year. The events in Qum serve as the backdrop 
for Khomeini’s declaration entitled “In Commemoration of the Martyrs at 
Qum,” given forty days later in spring of 1963.[21] In it Khomeini is 
commemorating the victims of the assault, while further decrying the ills and 
criminal nature of the Pahlavi government. In fiery tones, Khomeini says “I 
have repeatedly pointed out that the government has evil intentions and is 
opposed to the ordinances of Islam.”[22] He cites the example of the Ministry 
of Justice’s new law removing the requirement of judges being Muslim males 
as proof of the regime’s intentions, going on to say in an indiscreetly sectarian 
manner: “henceforth, Jews, Christians, and the enemies of Islam and the 
Muslims are to decide on affairs concerning the honor and person of the 
Muslims…As long as this usurpatory and rebellious government is in power, 
the Muslims can have no hope for any good.”[23]Later in the declaration 
Khomeini also raises the issue of the Pahlavi regime’s proposed treaty with 
Israel, “…Or is all this being done for the sake of Israel, since we are 
considered an obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty with Israel directed 
against the Islamic states?”[24] He follows this with “…The tyrannical regime 
imagines that through these inhuman acts and this repression it can deflect us 
from our aim, which is none other than the great aim of Islam-to prevent 
oppression, arbitrary rule, and the violation of the law; to preserve the rights 
of Islam and the nation; and to establish social justice.” These passages are 
echoed elsewhere by Khomeini and other secular parties to the anti-Shah and 
anti-imperialist movement, and indicate the concern over Iran’s subservience 
to foreign (American/Israeli) interests. While they may seem to suggest an 
anti-Semitic thread to Khomeini’s views, they can also be interpreted as 
solidarity with oppressed Muslims in Iran—Iranian Jews did represent a 
major slice of the economic elite—as well as Palestinian Muslims facing 
Zionist aggression within Israel and the Palestinian territories. 
While in exile, Khomeini remained politically active. From Iraq, Khomeini 
issued numerous writings and declarations commenting on political and 
religious matters within Iran, while continuing to actively condemn the Shah 
Pahlavi government. It is from the Iraqi city of Najaf that Khomeini delivered 
his famous series of lectures entitled “Islamic Government” between January-
February 1970, where they were recorded and later published in book 
form.[25] As translator Hamid Algar points out in his brief introduction, the 
lectures were given to an audience of students of religious studies, and was 
tailored to them as the next generation of Iranian leaders.[26] The section 
entitled “Introduction” features Khomeini continuing to call for a 
comprehensive system of law based on Islamic precepts, and right from the 
outset he refers to the “governance of the faqih” (religious scholar) as 
necessary to bring this about. He goes on to discuss various groups of 
opposition Islam has had to contend with, from the early days of it’s founding 
to recent history he comments “From the very beginning, the historical 
movement of Islam has had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who first 
established anti-Islamic propaganda and engaged in various stratagems and 
as you can see, this activity continues down to the present.”[27]Khomeini 
continues Islam’s list of adversaries with: 
“…These new groups began their imperialist penetration of the Muslim 
countries about three hundred years ago, and they regarded it as necessary to 
work for the extirpation of Islam in order to attain their ultimate 
goals…throughout this long historical period, and going back to the Crusades 
they felt that the major obstacle in the path of their materialistic ambitions 
and the chief threat to their political power was nothing but Islam and its 
ordinances…”[28] 
After setting Islam’s struggle against outside forces within this historical 
framework, he describes Islam as “the religion of militant individuals who are 
committed to truth and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom 
and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against 
imperialism.”[29] Again, Khomeini positions Islam’s followers as the agents of 
resistance. Throughout the lecture Khomeini also shows his disdain for the 
modern day subjection of Iran’s politics and culture to foreign values and 
interests, and condemns the agents of imperialism both foreign and local for 
violating Iranian sovereignty. One can see how this anti-imperialist rhetoric 
through religious appeals can be easily adapted to rhetoric expressed by the 
secular opposition parties in Iran, or other international revolutionary and 
anti-imperialist movements during the cold war era. 
The 1970s would see the continued growth of anti-shah sentiment amongst 
vast swaths of the Iranian population and of the religious movement’s 
importance within that opposition. Economic problems that existed in the 
country were exacerbated during this period, largely due to state policies that 
kept adding fuel to the opposition movement. Historian Misagh Parsa details 
how the Shah’s government had passed a series of economic and monetary 
measures that resulted in dramatic levels of inflation and financial losses to 
businesses, particularly those of the small bazaaris, who served as a major 
support base for the religious establishment. [30]Wealth inequality also 
continued to deepen during this period, and the economy and its perceived 
injustices would focus more of the opposition’s attention in the immediate 
run-up to 1978-1979. 
As was mentioned earlier, Khomeini continued to issue writings and 
declarations while in exile, and his popularity and prestige continued to grow 
in Iran as his works were smuggled into the country and 
circulated.[31] Khomeini’s eldest son was assassinated by the Shah’s police on 
November 23, 1977, which was soon followed by denunciations of Khomeini 
by the government controlled press.[32] This sparked outrage and 
demonstrations the following day in Qum, which met with violent suppression 
but would continue across the country throughout 1978, with continued 
encouragement from Khomeini through proclamations. Shortly before the 
culminating events at the beginning of the following year that resulted in the 
Shah’s forced departure from the country, Khomeini–still in exile–sat for an 
interview performed by Hamid Algar on December 29, 1978 at a villa in 
Neauphle-le-Chateau, France, where Khomeini now resided. Titled “Thirty 
Million People Have Stood Up”, the interview has Khomeini commenting on 
the current political situation in Iran and what obstacles remained for the 
removal of the Pahlavi regime, American influence, and what the potential 
impact on regional and international politics may be should the revolution 
succeed. Khomeini’s also offers some interesting thoughts on Shi’a Islam’s 
historical tradition of resistance to “illegitimate” authority. Identifying this 
rebellious aspect of Shi’a Islam, he remarks “From the outset, Shi’is have 
opposed oppressive governments…According to Shi’i belief, only the Imams or 
those who act on their behalf are the legitimate holders of authority; all other 
governments are illegitimate…If the Iranian people are now rising up against 
the Shah, they are doing so as Islamic duty.”[33] This passage is illustrative in 
two regards. One, it emphasizes the revolutionary aspect of Shi’a Islam native 
to Iran, crucial to Khomeini’s vision of Islamic governance. Second, it again 
expresses Khomeini’s belief in the necessity of religious scholars (Imam, 
Faqih) being the guardians of any proper Islamic government, a sentiment 
echoed in another source discussed earlier in this paper (the Faqih, or 
religious scholars of the Qum declaration). By this point, Khomeini and his 
faction of clerics had effectively taken leadership of the revolutionary 
movement, and Khomeini claims as much in the interview.[34] 
This theme of the religious movement’s leadership is continuously expressed 
by Khomeini, but before further considering that, it is worth offering another 
quick word on how the clerics were able to consolidate their position. As was 
touched on earlier, the Pahlavi government’s active suppression of nationalist 
and leftist groups, particularly through the instrument of the state secret 
police SAVAK, provided the opening for the religious faction to assume 
leadership of the anti-shah opposition. Additionally, the mosque had a strong 
support base from other segments of Iranian society, in particular the bazaar. 
Bazaaris and the religious establishment had long supported one another and 
formed an essential aspect of Iran’s traditional culture.[35] Bazaaris formed 
the financial support base for the mosque, while the religious clerics would 
play “a significant part in the moral intellectual and political lives of the bazaar 
merchants, artisans and workers.”[36] Indeed, there would emerge what 
Pesaran describes as “pro-bazaar” and “pro-state” views within the clerical 
faction, the former favoring limited nationalization and private property 
rights, and the latter advocating strong state control over economic matters 
and national resources. Both groups were united in desiring economic 
independence and rejecting western infiltration of the economy.[37] The 
religious scholars (Faqih) were well placed to lead the revolution. Khomeini 
talks about this in a second interview with Hamid Algar entitled “The 
Religious Scholars Led the Revolt”. Originally published in a Persian 
newspaper, the interview took place on December 29, 1979 at Khomeini’s 
residence in Qum, after the monarchy had been overthrown and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran established. The interview focuses on the role of the religious 
leaders in the revolution as well their position in the new political system. 
Khomeini characterizes their role thus: “Throughout the different stages of the 
Revolution, the religious leaders played the primary role. Of course, others 
also took part—university professors, intellectuals, merchants, students—but 
it was the religious leaders who mobilized the whole people.”[38] Regarding 
their role in the revolutionary government, Khomeini says the religious 
scholar doesn’t seek official leading positions such as President or Prime 
minister, but will perform a supervisory role, and that “He will exercise this 
role on behalf of the people. If the government begins to misbehave, the 
religious scholar will stand in its way.”[39] This principle of the authority of 
the religious scholars would be sanctified by the new constitution and a 
referendum held in March 1979 favoring the establishment of an Islamic 
Republic.[40] It further demonstrates Khomeini’s conviction that the clerics 
were the designated guardians of this Islamic revolution and its ideals. 
Islamic Republic’s Implementation of Revolutionary goals 
In the immediate aftermath of the shah’s departure in January of 1979 and the 
collapse of the interim government in February, a provisional government was 
created headed by Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, which would last until 
November. This government would take a moderate line and was, according to 
Pesaran, “willing to maintain the economic framework of the Shah’s regime”, 
keeping on much of the bureaucratic personnel of that regime.[41] This would 
not satisfy the agenda of either the pro-bazaar or pro-state factions of the 
other revolutionary parties. As the year went on, the departure of wealthy 
businessmen and capital and the pressure exerted by the more radical 
revolutionary elements for a more state- managed, “Islamized” economy 
weakened the position of Bazargan’s government.[42] Bazargan’s government 
wound up resigning after the takeover of the American Embassy in November 
1979 by university students supporting Khomeini, which then resulted in the 
strengthening of the pro-state clerical faction within the government. Going 
forward, this clerical faction and the new Islamic Revolutionary Council would 
exert the most influence over the writing of the new constitution.[43] As 
Pesaran notes, the Assembly of Experts drafting the new constitution were 
concerned with ensuring against any foreign or imperialist domination over 
the nation’s economy, citing Articles 3, 43, and particularly 153 with its 
outlawing of “any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the 
natural resources, economy, army, or culture of the country”, echoing 
Khomeini’s calls elsewhere for national and cultural sovereignty.[44] 
Articles 44, 81, and 82 would further enshrine these values of economic 
independence anti-imperialism. 44 divides the economy into “state, 
cooperative, and private” sectors.[45] How each sector would be defined 
remained ambiguous, and the designated private sector would seem to offer 
some concession to the bazaar class and private property interests. However, 
the article makes clear that a wide range of economic activity should fall under 
state control. Pesaran offers some of the Article’s language: “the state sector is 
to include all large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major minerals, 
banking, insurance, power generation, dams, and large-scale irrigation 
networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, 
aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all these will be publicly 
owned and administered by the state.” Apparently, the Assembly of Experts 
were interested in creating an economy based on Islamic precepts, as 
Assembly delegate Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi comments, “…we 
wanted to create an Islamic economy that would be not Western capitalism 
and not Easter socialism. On this basis, we created these three 
sectors.”[46] Article 81 prohibited concessions to foreign parties in a variety of 
areas such as commerce, industry, agriculture, mining or services.[47] Even 
the domestic private sector would remained heavily restricted in the 
abovementioned areas or in the attainment of monopolies in any economic 
activity, though conditions for concessions to Iranian companies would 
remain ambiguously up to government approval.[48] Article 82 was directed 
at foreign employment, requiring any foreigner to obtain a work permit from 
the government whether in the private or public sphere.[49] All these 
constitutional measures indicate the leadership’s caution against foreign 
involvement in the nation’s economy. 
Conclusion 
Thirty seven years later, the Islamic Republic of Iran still exists, with many of 
its revolutionary principles still in place. As we have noted throughout this 
essay, this is largely due to the ideas that drove the revolutionary movement, 
namely anti-imperialism, social and economic justice, independence, and the 
enshrinement of these principles in the new constitution. We have seen in a 
number of sources how Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini voiced these concerns in 
a manner that allowed him and his faction of religious scholars to unite the 
various anti-shah groups and take leadership of the movement, and achieve 
the greatest political gains in the new Islamic Republic that emerged. It is 
arguable that to varying degrees the Iranian example has inspired a number of 
other Islamist movements in the region, particularly the Lebanese Shia 
political party and militia Hezbollah, a major ally of Iran. Sunni Muslim 
militant groups have also emerged in the form of al-Qaeda and its offshoots, 
including the Islamic State/ISIS. Since the revolution, Iran continues to resist 
outside intervention and has maintained tense relations with the United States 
and its allies both regionally and internationally. This is most visible today 
with the current diplomatic debate over Iran’s nuclear development capacity 
and its potential for acquiring nuclear weapons. Severe international 
economic sanctions were placed against Iran, though recent developments in 
the summer of 2015 have resulted in a new agreement whereby Iran will agree 
to limit its nuclear development in exchange for a loosening of the sanctions, a 
process that is ongoing. Additionally, recent regional conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Iraq have indirectly seen an overlap of interests between the United States 
and Iran in certain political and military issues concerning sectarian tensions 
and Iranian links to Shia elements within the U.S. installed Iraqi government. 
However, continued U.S. and regional hostility towards Iran continues to fuel 
other conflicts in Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and to a lesser degree 
Yemen. Having reflected on these issues and the historical circumstances 
preceding them, it is clear that the Iranian Revolution and the clerics who led 
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